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Introduction 
Norms governing academic science are different from those governing patent law. Yet 
the two spheres are increasingly in contact, and sometimes conflict, as many academics patent 
their scientific discoveries. Under U.S. law, patents can be invalidated for omitting inventors. 
Such omissions can arise from discrepancies between the criteria for authorship and that for 
inventorship, but they can also arise from illegitimate exclusion of actual inventors. Junior 
scientists are more likely to be excluded, both by conventional wisdom as well as data-driven 
analyses.1 A few junior scientists have brought their grievances to court, some with more success 
than others.2 Recent and ongoing lawsuits between students and their superiors underscore the 
persisting incongruence between publishing and patenting norms particularly with respect to 
seniority.3 Even if they are included as inventors, junior scientists have faced discrimination in 
the patenting process.4 Given the reputational and monetary costs, research universities have an 
incentive to reconcile the publishing and patenting spheres of academic science. 
                                                          
1 Lissoni, F. et al. “Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights: An enquiry into the economics of scientific 
credit.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 95, (2013): 46-49; Haeussler, C., Sauermann, H., “Credit 
where credit is due? The impact of project contributions and social factors on authorship and inventorship.” 
Research Policy 42(3), 2013: 688-703. 
2 For an example of success, see Chou v. University of Chicago, 2000 WL 222638 (N.D Ill. 2000) and the 
discussion on it later in the thesis. For an example of failure, see Stern v. The Trustees of the University of 
Columbia in New York City, 01-CV-10086 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 17, 2005). For other past cases, see Smith, G. Kenneth. 
"Faculty and Graduate Student Generated Inventions: Is University Ownership a Legal Certainty?" Va. JL & Tech. 1 
(1997): 4-7. 
3 For a recently decided case, see Hor v. Chu, No. 11-1540 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2012). For an ongoing case, see 
Sclimenti v. Leland Stanford Junior University et al, filed on September 22, 2008 to the California Southern District 
Court.  
4 For an example, see the discussion on streptomycin, Albert Schatz, Selman Waksman, and Rutgers University in a 
later chapter. Although Schatz was named an inventor, he did not receive the corresponding treatment with regards 
to royalties and international patents. His lawsuit and the publicity it generated led Rutgers University to settle 
generously with him in private. More recently, a former graduate student of chemistry at Harvard University Mark 
Charest sued his professor Andrew Myers for fraud, breach of contract concerning antibiotic synthesis royalties. 
Filed on June 28, 2013 to the Massachusetts District Court, the case has received media attention. 
How can universities improve management of authors and inventors in the life sciences? 
To inform university policy and practice on authorship and inventorship, I seek to better 
understand the publishing and patenting norms in academia. Specifically, this thesis addresses 
the following questions: To what extent do conceptions of inventorship and authorship overlap 
formally, and to what extent do seniority, gender, and collaboration within and across institutions 
affect an author’s likelihood of being named as an inventor? To what extent do disputes over 
invention impose costs, monetary and reputational, for the universities involved, and what can 
they do to prevent and mitigate those costs? 
I approach the first of these questions in Chapter 1 by comparing the formal criteria for 
inventorship from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and authorship from 
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) and other sources. While 
inventorship and authorship share many formal requirements, they are by no means synonyms. 
Authors can legitimately be dropped from the corresponding patent, for example, if they 
contribute only to the interpretation and analysis of data but not to the design and conception of 
the patented invention.  
Chapter 2 presents a logistic regression that uses patent-paper pair data and shows that 
more junior authors as well as authors working in larger groups and across more institutions are 
less likely to be named as inventors. While much has been written about the role of seniority in 
credit assignment in academic science, the empirical evidence also calls our attention to the 
growth in scientific collaboration and the difficulties that having more authors and potential 
inventors may pose for technology transfer offices in the future.  
Chapter 3 consists of three case studies in which junior scientists experienced differential 
treatment either in the initial naming or subsequent stages of university patenting activities. The 
first concerns recombinant DNA technology developed by biochemists and geneticists at 
Stanford University and the University of California, San Francisco in the early 1970s. Although 
the inventorship disputes were never brought to court, junior authors who were omitted from the 
patent—John Morrow and Robert Helling—expressed their dissent through other avenues and 
attempted to attain inventorship. The discrepancy resulted in prolonged patent examination, 
associated legal fees, and a less profitable licensing scheme for the universities involved. 
Another prominent case in the biomedical sciences is the discovery of streptomycin, a powerful 
antibiotic, by Selman Waksman and his graduate student Albert Schatz. Listed as an inventor, 
Schatz was not treated as Waksman’s equal in decisions concerning the patent. Questionable 
behavior on the part of the professor further generated negative publicity when Schatz sued. The 
dispute, about which Peter Pringle wrote a book, Experiment Eleven, in 2012, tarnished the 
reputation of Rutgers University, and resulted in monetary payments to Schatz. The last case, the 
only one decided in court, pertains to herpes vaccines developed by Joanne Chou and her mentor 
Alex Roizman at the University of Chicago in the late 1990s. Excluded from inventorship, Chou 
successfully sued Roizman and the University for breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims, 
and became entitled to 25% of the royalties. 
The concluding chapter synthesizes evidence from the qualitative case studies and 
quantitative regression analysis on the roles of seniority, gender, and collaboration in 
discrepancies between authorship and inventorship at and their costs to American research 
universities. Broadly, I conclude that universities might best protect themselves by increasing 
transparency and accountability in laboratories, and offers examples of possible action by 
universities and academic journals to facilitate that change. 
  
Chapter 1: Authorship and Inventorship—Criteria and Literature Review 
As patenting in the biomedical sciences become more common in academia, the process 
governing the transfer of scientific credit from publications to patents has become increasingly 
consequential. Many have noticed the discrepancy between the number of coauthors on 
publications and that of coinventors on the corresponding patents; Philippe Ducor, a Swiss 
professor and practitioner of intellectual property law in the life sciences, argues that there 
should be no discrepancy given the authorship guidelines of the International Council of Medical 
Journal Editors (ICMJE) and the inventorship criteria from United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). He concludes that they “use essentially the same principles and terminology: 
both are based on substantial contributions to conception and design.”5 Through a sample of 
forty patent-paper pairs in a field of molecular biology, he found the average number of authors 
to be ten and that of inventors to be three.6 He suggests several potential causes, including salami 
science7, coauthorship inflation, dilution of responsibility for content, and gift authorship. Even 
though the exclusion of some coauthors on a patent would be valid under these scenarios, he 
notes that any discrepancy nonetheless “creates the presumption that one or more inventors were 
omitted and constitutes a legal hazard on both the validity and the value of the patent.”8 Both the 
issues of authorship assignment and the transfer from that to inventorship are therefore relevant 
to the owners of these patents, namely the research universities in our study. 
                                                          
5 Ducor, Philippe. "Intellectual property: coauthorship and coinventorship." Science 289, no. 5481 (2000): 873-875. 
6 14 article-patent pairs in which the first, the last, or authors in both positions on the paper were not mentioned as 
inventors on the corresponding patent. Method: manual search of databases for paper-patent pairs whose main 
disclosure were (genetic/amino acid sequence for) proteins in a field in molecular biology. Results: Out of 40 article-
patent pairs, the last author was named as inventor in 37 cases, whereas the first author was named in 26 cases. 38 
had more authors than inventors, 2 had as many inventors as authors, and none listed more inventors than authors. 
The average number of authors was 10 and the average number of inventors was 3. 
7 Salami-slicing refers to “the practice of fragmenting single coherent bodies of research into as many publications 
as possible.” See “The cost of salami slicing,” Editorial, Nature Materials 4, (2005): 1. 
8 Ducor, “Coauthorship and Coinvnetorship.” (2000). 
There has been a wealth of information and publications on academic authorship, 
clarifying its purpose in science as well as warning against unethical practices.9 In theory, 
authorship, as recognition for scientific priority, is meant to spur the growth of science.10 
Practically, however, authorship is the currency through which academic researchers earn 
funding, prestige, and tenure.11 Evident from the motto, “publish or perish,” scientists face 
considerable pressure to publish, which plausibly leads to creative and unethical solutions. 
Merton suggests that the incentive is further augmented because recognition and esteem are the 
“sole property right of the scientist in his discoveries,” a result of the institutional norm of 
communism and humility.12 Career pressures and the reward system of science combined have 
contributed to the rise of problematic practices in authorship assignment.13 
“Salami-slicing” is one of them. The term refers to the “the practice of fragmenting single 
coherent bodies of research into as many publications as possible,” or in other words, shortening 
the least publishable unit (LPU) to inflate publication counts.14 In as early as 1981, William J. 
                                                          
9 For the purpose of authorship in science, see Robert K. Merton, “Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in 
the Sociology of Science.” American Sociological Review, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Dec., 1957), pp. 635-659; Kevin Strange, 
“Authorship: why not just toss a coin?” American Journal of Physiology Cell Physiology 295(3), 2008: 567-575; 
Biagioli, Mario, and Peter Galison, eds. Scientific authorship: Credit and intellectual property in science. 
Routledge, 2014. Published in many prominent journals, warnings against unethical practices take the form of 
editorials, of which the following form a small collection: Luther Friedy, “Publication ethics and scientific 
misconduct: the role of authors,” Journal of Orthodontics 35, (2008): 1-4; “The cost of salami slicing,” Nature 
Materials 4, (2005): 1; Titus, Sandra L., James A. Wells, and Lawrence J. Rhoades. "Repairing research integrity." 
Nature 453, no. 7198 (2008): 980-982; Alberts, Bruce, “Promoting Scientific Standards,” Science 327, (2010): 12. 
Alberts and Kenneth Shine also called for “high ethical standards” in the journal nearly two decades ago: B. Alberts, 
K. Shine, Science 266, (1994): 1660. 
10 For more on the role of authorship in science, see Robert K. Merton, “Priorities in Scientific Discovery” and “The 
normative structure of science.”The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations 267, (1973). 
11 Louis, Karen Seashore, Janet M. Holdsworth, Melissa S. Anderson, and Eric G. Campbell. "Everyday ethics in 
research: Translating authorship guidelines into practice in the bench sciences." The Journal of Higher Education 
79, no. 1 (2008): 88-112. 
12 For institutional norm of communism, see Merton, “Normative Structure of Science.” For institutional norm of 
humility, see Merton, “Priority in the Sciences.” 
13 Diane Bennett and David Taylor, “Unethical Practices in authorship of scientific papers,” Emergency Medicine 
(2003) 15, 263-270; “The cost of salami slicing,” Nature Materials 4, 1 (2005). 
14 “The cost of salami slicing,” Nature Materials 4, 1 (2005). 
Broad noted the problem as well as that of publishing the same data several times.15 There are 
many perils associated with “salami-slicing,” among them the financial burden of maintaining a 
large number of journals; the time referees waste on reviewing articles that make little original 
contribution; loss of meaningful comparisons of data due to slicing; over-representation of the 
same patient series in medical literature to name a few prominent concerns.16  
Another issue broadly written about by academics and journal editors alike is that of 
“gift” and “ghost” authorship. The former pertains to individuals who are named as authors 
without meeting the criteria, and the latter to those who are not named as authors while satisfying 
the requirements. Neither assignment abides by the formal authorship requirements of the 
ICMJE, yet both occur frequently in high impact journals that adopt those criteria. Corroborating 
past studies, Wislar et al. estimated the prevalence of articles with a gift or ghost author or both 
in six respected medical journals at 21%.17 Since there is no way for reviewers to know the 
specific contributions of the authors given the current disclosure format, scholars have found 
widespread non-compliance of ICMJE or other journal-specific authorship criteria. Bates et al. 
found that 60% of 72 articles in the Annals of Internal Medicine and 21% of 107 articles in the 
British Medical Journal have at least one author that does not meet the first ICJME criterion.18 
                                                          
15 Board, William J. “The Publishing Game.” (1981). 
16 “The cost of salami slicing,” Nature Materials 4, 1 (2005); William J. Dupps and J. Bradley Randleman, “The 
Perils of the Least Publishable Unit,” Journal of Refractive Surgery 28, 9 (2012): 601-602. 
17 Wislar, Joseph S., Annette Flanagin, Phil B. Fontanarosa, and Catherine D. DeAngelis. "Honorary and ghost 
authorship in high impact biomedical journals: a cross sectional survey." BMJ: British Medical Journal 343 (2011). 
For past studies, see Mowatt, Graham, Liz Shirran, Jeremy M. Grimshaw, Drummond Rennie, Annette Flanagin, 
Veronica Yank, Graeme MacLennan, Peter C. Gøtzsche, and Lisa A. Bero. "Prevalence of honorary and ghost 
authorship in Cochrane reviews." Jama 287, no. 21 (2002): 2769-2771; Flanagin, Annette, Lisa A. Carey, Phil B. 
Fontanarosa, Stephanie G. Phillips, Brian P. Pace, George D. Lundberg, and Drummond Rennie. "Prevalence of 
articles with honorary authors and ghost authors in peer-reviewed medical journals." Jama 280, no. 3 (1998): 222-
224. 
18Bates, Tamara, Ante Anić, Matko Marušić, and Ana Marušić. "Authorship criteria and disclosure of contributions: 
comparison of 3 general medical journals with different author contribution forms." Jama 292, no. 1 (2004): 86-88. 
Similar results were found in the Journal of Radiology, The Lancet, and the Dutch Medical 
Journal.19 
Under the above scenarios, some coauthors should indeed be excluded as an inventor, 
because they would likely not meet the criteria specified in patent law, namely that one was 
involved in the conception of the invention and contributed to at least one claim.20 Even if all 
authors satisfy the ICMJE requirements, there are legitimate reasons for discrepancy between 
number of coauthors and that of coinventors. One is that conception is not required of authors by 
the ICMJE criteria, which consist of the following: 
 Substantial contributions to the conception or design of the work; or the acquisition, 
analysis, or interpretation of data for the work; AND  
 Drafting the work or revising it critically for important intellectual content; AND  
 Final approval of the version to be published; AND  
 Agreement to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related 
to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and 
resolved.21 
In other words, if the researcher contributes substantially to “the acquisition, analysis, or 
interpretation of data for the work,” he can be a legitimate author by the ICMJE criteria without 
conceiving any part. Those contributions alone, however, would not qualify the researcher for 
inventorship on the corresponding patent. 
                                                          
19 Hwang, S. S., et al., “Researcher contributions and fulfillment of ICMJE authorship criteria: analysis of author 
contribution lists in research articles with multiple authors.” Radiology 22 (2003): 16-23. 
20 Patents, 35 U.S.C. § 116. 
21 ICMJE, 2007. Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for 
Biomedical Publication. International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, http://www.icmje.org/roles_a.html 
Another reason is that conception becomes plausibly harder to define when researchers 
collaborate in larger teams. According to the Scientific Citation Index (originally produced by 
the Institute for Scientific Information, which is now known as Thomas Reuters), the average 
number of authors per paper was 1.67 in 1960, 2.58 in 1980, 3.18 in 1990, and most recently 
4.83 in 2010.22 Similar statistics have been published by the National Library of Medicine on 
PubMed/MEDLINE publications: The average number of authors has steadily risen from 1.90 
for pre-1975 articles to 5.03 for those published between 2010 and 2012 (See Figure 1). 
Moreover, the maximum number of authors on a given paper was 39 for the former timeframe 
and 3,172 for the latter.23 There have been different reasons suggested for this rise in the number 
of co-authors, such as the spread of gratuitous authorship, other unethical practices, as well as the 
increased desirability of collaboration given the need for more specialized knowledge.24 The 
implication remains, however, that accurately defining each person’s contribution and achieving 
consensus are more difficult when research involves teams of tens, hundreds, or even thousands. 
These difficulties are magnified when assigning inventorship, which involves legal responsibility 
and monetary rewards absent from conventional authorship. 
Some reasons for the discrepancy between the number of coauthors and coinventors 
pertain to the process of translating academic work into patents. First, universities often leave 
inventorship assignment to the principal investigator in a given laboratory.25 Accustomed to the 
                                                          
22 Board, “The Publishing Game,” 1981; Paul Jump, “The expanding universe of scientific authorship,” Times 
Higher Education, July 8, 2010.  
23 “Number of Authors per MEDLINE®/PubMed® Citation,” National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of 
Health,  http://www.nlm.nih.gov/bsd/authors1.html 
24 Gans, Joshua S. and Murray, Fiona, Credit History: The Changing Nature of Scientific Credit (October 9, 2013). 
Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 2338038; de Solla Price, Derek J., and Donald Beaver. 
"Collaboration in an invisible college." American psychologist 21, no. 11 (1966): 1011; Jones, Anne Hudson. 
"Changing traditions of authorship." Ethical issues in biomedical publication (2000): 3-29. 
25 Fasse, W. F., “The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning Up after the 1984 Amendments to 35 
U.S.C. § 116.” Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 5, (1992): 73-74; Colyvas, J.A., “From divergent meanings 
conventions of academia, these individuals might act according to them without fully 
understanding the legal definition of an inventor. Secondly, patent examiners do not rigorously 
check the inventors named by the applying institution or individuals.26 Signed declarations are 
sufficient, and if not challenged in court, most inventorship attribution retains its original form 
without scrutiny. Combined, these procedural norms further promote discrepancies in authorship 
and inventorship assignment, as the former increases the likelihood of incorrect assignment and 
the latter decreases the incentive on the applicants’ part to rigorously review and apply the 
formal criteria for inventorship.  
Figure 1| Personal Author Counts from 1975-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The data presented were extracted from the 2014 Statistical Reports on MEDLINE®/PubMed® Baseline 
Data, which include detailed statistics on all data elements in the baseline database. The baseline contains all 
completed records in PubMed at the end of the NLM 2013 production year, which occurred in mid-November, after 
the global updating for the new year of MeSH (Medical Subject Headings). Publication Year 2013 is not yet 
complete and a few hundred citations with Publication Year 2014 are included. The baseline files exclude PubMed 
records identified as "in process" or "as supplied by publisher" (approx. 4% of the total). Note that very few citations 
from 1966-2000 contain collective author data. Source: “Number of Authors per MEDLINE®/PubMed® Citation,” 
National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/bsd/authors1.html 
                                                          
to common practices: the early institutionalization of technology transfer in the life sciences at Stanford University.” 
Research Policy 36, (2007): 91-109. 
26 Lissoni et al. “Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights.” (2013). 
Several scholars have explored the economics of the discrepancy of interest. Through a 
sample of 680 Italian patent-publication pairs (related sets of patents and publications), 
economists Francesco Lissoni, Fabio Montobbio, and Lorenzo Ziruila have shown that the first 
and last authors are less likely to be excluded from the patent.27 Though not formalized, the first 
authors are generally the main researchers on the project, and the last the senior mentor and head 
of the laboratory.28 More precisely, Lissoni et al. found that the probability of exclusion declines 
with seniority and increases for women.29 Other researchers have observed similar trends with 
regards to seniority but not gender in the German and British life sciences.30 Research showing 
that American scientists comply with the ICMJE criteria more than their international 
counterparts provides another rationale for investigating possible cross-national differences.31 
Beyond the lack of an existing analysis on inventorship assignment trends in American 
universities, the preeminence and productivity of the American science community motivate my 
attempt to fill the void with regression modeling. 
 Several plausible explanations have been put forth for the lower likelihood of being 
named as an inventor among junior researchers. It could be that junior researchers contribute 
solely to the “reduction to practice” and not the “conception” component of inventorship. Others 
have suggested that junior researchers value inventorship less, as opposed to authorship, the 
                                                          
27 Lissoni et al. “Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights.” (2013). 
28 Teja Tscharntke et al. “Author Sequence and Credit for Contributions in Multiauthored Publications.” PLoS Biol. 
5, (2007). Published online 2007 January 16. 
29 Lissoni et al. “Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights.” (2013). 
30 Haeussler, C., Sauermann, H., “Credit where credit is due?” (2013).  
31 Hwang, S. S., et al., “Researcher contributions and fulfillment of ICMJE authorship criteria.” (2003); Hoen WP, 
Walvoort HC, Overbeke AJ. What are the factors determining authorship and the order of the authors’ names? A 
study among authors of the Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde (Dutch Journal of Medicine). JAMA 280, 
(1998): 217-218; Yank V, Rennie D. “Disclosure of researcher contributions: a study of original research articles in 
The Lancet.” Ann Intern Med 130, (1999): 661-670. 
traditional currency for advancing their careers.32 Still some attribute the phenomenon to “the 
Matthew Effect,” which American sociologist Robert K. Merton describes as “the accruing of 
greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of 
considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet 
made their mark.”33 Although Merton’s discussion focuses on the common forms of recognition 
at the time, namely authorship, memberships in various Academies, and prestigious awards such 
as the Nobel Prize, the concept readily applies to inventorship.  
To explain trends in gender, some have hypothesized that women value inventorship less 
holding all else constant, while others have suggested differences in access to industry contacts 
and perception of the time commitment demanded by commercial activity.34 Using a Cox 
regression model35 on data of faculty who earned their doctorates between 1967 and 1995 in 
diverse disciplines in the United States, Ding et al. estimated that female life scientists patent at a 
rate that is only 0.40 times that of their male counterparts, controlling for productivity, social 
                                                          
32 Stephan, P.E., and Levin, S. Striking the Mother Lode in Science: The Importance of Age, Place and Time. Oxford 
University Press, New York: 1992. Audretsch, D.B., and Stephan, P.E., “Knowledge spillovers in biotechnology: 
sources and incentives.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 9, (1999): 97-107. 
33 Merton, Robert K., “The Matthew Effect in Science: The reward and communication systems of science are 
considered.” Science 159(3810): 58. January 5, 1968.  
34 Azoulay, Pierre, Waverly Ding, and Toby Stuart. "The determinants of faculty patenting behavior: Demographics 
or opportunities?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63, no. 4 (2007): 599-623; Ding, Waverly W., 
Fiona Murray, and Toby E. Stuart. "Gender differences in patenting in the academic life sciences." Science 313, no. 
5787 (2006): 665-667; Murray, Fiona, and Leigh Graham. "Buying science and selling science: gender differences 
in the market for commercial science." Industrial and Corporate Change 16, no. 4 (2007): 657-689; Whittington, 
Kjersten Bunker, and Laurel Smith-Doerr. "Women Inventors in Context Disparities in Patenting across Academia 
and Industry." Gender & Society 22, no. 2 (2008): 194-218. 
35 Cox regression, a proportional hazard model, belongs to class of survival models that relate the time that elapses 
before an event occurs to different covariates. The coefficient for a given covariate then pertains to the impact of a 
unit increase in that covariate on the hazard rate of the event occurring. In the context of Ding et al., the event is 
patenting and the covariates include gender, and the coefficient 0.40 means that being female decreases the rate of 
patenting by a factor of 0.40. The Cox regression model estimates pertain to rates of patenting, whereas the model in 
Lissoni et al. and the next chapter in this thesis measures the probability of being named an inventor conditional on 
being named an author. 
network, scientific field, and employer characteristics.36 After concluding that there is no notable 
gender difference in the scholarly influence of research, as measured by journal impact factor 
(JIF), the authors outlined two possible explanations based on interviews: Women have fewer 
contacts in industry but more concerns that pursuing commercial opportunities might hinder their 
university careers.37 On the other hand, women seem to enjoy more encouragement from their 
coauthors and institutional advisors to consider patenting as part of their research undertaking. 
Furthermore, other studies have found that gender gaps in disclosure and patenting activity have 
narrowed, even converged, in recent years.38 These analyses are not directly comparable with 
that employed in Lissoni et al. and the next chapter, but they provide valuable context to the 
findings reported later.39 
While many have suggested solutions to the problems with authorship,40 and some 
journals have adopted them,41 less has been proposed for universities and their technology 
transfer offices. From their standpoint, discrepancy between the number of coauthors and 
coinventors increases the vulnerability of their patent portfolio and decreases its monetary value. 
And since much of the discrepancy stems from vagueness surrounding authorship assignment, 
universities can solve parts of the problem by adopting strategies similar to journals, by requiring 
employees to track and disclose their contributions to publications and patents systematically. 
Through regression modeling, I investigate patterns in inventorship assignment in American 
                                                          
36 Ding, Waverly W., Fiona Murray, and Toby E. Stuart. "Gender differences in patenting in the academic life 
sciences." (2006). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.; Thursby, Jerry G., and Marie C. Thursby. "Gender patterns of research and licensing activity of science and 
engineering faculty." The Journal of Technology Transfer 30, no. 4 (2005): 343-353. 
39 See footnote 35. 
40 Sebastian Frische, “It is time for full disclosure of author contributions.” Science 489, 475 (27 September 2012); 
Vicens, Quentin, and Philip E. Bourne. "Ten simple rules for a successful collaboration." PLoS computational 
biology 3, no. 3 (2007): e44. 
41 The Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences require coauthors to publish their contributions to the 
work as a footnote in the paper. Nature journals encourage authors to do so. 
research universities. Then, through case studies in the biomedical sciences, I demonstrate some 
implications, particularly the reputational and monetary costs, of patent-publication disputes for 
academic institutions. Concluding, I explore their alternatives not only for preventing illegitimate 
discrepancy between coauthors and coinventors but also for protecting themselves with valid 
processes when a discrepancy is legitimate. Adherence to authorship and inventorship criteria 
can strengthen patents and also more fairly reward contributions to patented inventions arising in 
research universities.  
  
Chapter 2: Factors in Inventorship Attribution 
Background 
 Discrepancies between authorship and inventorship are widespread, prompting many to 
opine about the causes, consequences, and occasionally solutions to the phenomenon.42 While 
some discrepancies stem from legitimate differences between authorship and inventorship 
criteria, others arise from academic norms concerning gender and seniority, difficulties reaching 
consensus and defining contributions among many collaborators, as well as various unethical 
practices such as gratuitous authorship.43 Past research using patent-paper pairs (PPP) in Italian, 
British, and German science has found consistently that junior authors are less likely to be named 
inventors, but female scientists seem only disadvantaged in Italy.44 The objective of this analysis 
is not only to characterize seniority and gender trends in the United States through American 
PPPs, but also to investigate the effects of collaboration in light of the increased need for more 
specialized knowledge in modern science.45 
Data  
We use PPP data from Stern and Murray 2005, which were constructed from 340 
research articles published between 1997 and 1999 in Nature Biotechnology.46 To estimate the 
effects of gender, seniority, and collaboration at American universities, we include PPPs whose 
                                                          
42 See footnotes 5, 9, 11, and 39. 
43 See footnote 23. 
44 See footnotes 1 and 18. 
45 See footnote 23. 
46 Murray, Fiona, and Scott Stern. "Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific 
knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63, 
no. 4 (2007): 648-687. The authors detail the process of constructing the PPP dataset there. I thank them for sharing 
their dataset with me, without which this analysis would not have been feasible. 
patent had at least one American and academic assignee. Seventy-five PPPs and 392 authors 
qualified.  
To measure the impact of collaborating within and across institutions, we use the number 
of authors and institutions. The average number of authors is 6.554, with a minimum of one and 
a maximum of seventeen. The average number of institutions is 2.052, with a minimum of one 
and a maximum of five. Given theories on the burden of knowledge, these statistics would be 
much larger for more recent articles, further magnifying the effects we identify in our analysis. 
For gender, three authors are randomly assigned as either female or male, since neither 
their names nor a thorough internet search yields any useful information. The results are not 
sensitive to their gender assignment for all possible permutations. The sample is predominantly 
male, with only 69 individuals or 21.2% being female. As gender roles evolve over the last 
decade, and women account for more than 40% of full time faculty at American universities 
(compared to around 35% in 2000), the composition of inventors might have also changed.47 
Seniority is measured in both absolute and relative terms. For the former, we record the 
year of completing the doctoral thesis and/or medical school. Twenty-eight authors have neither 
a Ph.D. nor a M.D. degree. Forty-one have both, and sixty-six authors cannot be identified 
through ProQuest dissertation database, U.S. News doctor database, or internet search using the 
name and institution provided on the publication. For six authors who are known to have a 
doctorate or medical degree whose date could not be easily ascertained (e.g. ProQuest does not 
include dissertations completed outside of the U.S., U.K., and Ireland), we substitute the year of 
                                                          
47 John W. Curtis, Persistent Inequity: Gender and Academic Employment, special report prepared for Equal Pay 
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the author’s earliest PubMed citation.48 Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these 
observations. The final number of authors is 325. 
As in Lissoni et al., we also measure author i's seniority relative to the other authors using 
the following equation: 
RELATIVE SENIORITYij = ti – tj 
where ti is the year of author i's first advanced degree and tj is that of the most senior author’s 
first advanced degree. Although the absolute measure of seniority is comparable across the 
authors in our dataset because the papers were all published within two years of each other, the 
relative measure captures the context of each PPP in which authorship and inventorship were 
decided.  
In line with previous studies, we also include indicator variables for being the first or last 
author. Given academic norms concerning authorship order, these variables serve as proxies for 
rough estimates of seniority and provide a framework for checking the robustness of results 
regarding absolute and relative seniority. In addition, we include indicator variables for not 
having a Ph.D., an M.D., and neither. These variables provide an estimate of the extensive 
marginal effect of having an advanced degree. There are many plausible confounding factors 
beyond academic rank and seniority that can decrease the likelihood of an author without an 
advanced degree being named as an inventor. For example, those without an advanced degree 
might be truly lacking in creativity and aptitude for conception required for an inventor. Rather 
than academic rank, their intellectual inclinations can be the primary driver behind their being 
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omitted from the patent. Nonetheless, these variables provide a framework for quantifying the 
impact of not having an advanced degree, a condition that applies to a non-negligible fraction of 
research personnel such as technicians and research assistants in many universities. 
Methods 
 We use a logistic regression model to estimate the effect of each covariate on the 
probability of an author being named an inventor. The specifications follow the same form as the 
equation below, which contains only covariates used in the preferred specification:  
 
  
 
  
  
We assess the characteristics of the authors (Table 1). We also examine the relationship 
between the covariates. Given moderate correlation between the number of authors and 
institutions (ρ= 0.40), the final model only includes the former, because it is more statistically 
significant. Furthermore, we regress likelihood of being named the first or last authors on 
absolute and relative measures of seniority. The results indicate that seniority predicts first and 
last authors well (Table 2). In order to avoid inflated standard errors often caused by correlated 
covariates, the final model includes only a subset of seniority-related variables. Lastly, we 
explore interaction terms but none of them appear to be statistically significant. Selected 
specifications adjusting for different combinations of covariates are reported below (Table 3). 
Table 1 | Characteristics of Authors Sample. 
 Sample (N=325) 
Named Inventor (%) 49.5% 
Female (%) 21.2% 
Ph.D. (%) 76.9% 
Ph.D. Year  
     Min. 1953 
     1st Quartile 1980 
     Mean 1986 
     3rd Quartile 1994 
     Max 2007 
M.D. (%) 27.1% 
M.D. Year  
     Min. 1960 
     1st Quartile 1981 
     Mean 1986 
     3rd Quartile 1993 
     Max 2005 
Relative Seniority  
     Min. -30 
     1st Quartile 0 
     Mean 10.44 
     3rd Quartile 18 
     Max 41 
No Advanced Degree 
(%) 
8.62% 
First Authors 21.2% 
Last Authors 22.8%* 
Number of Authors  
     Min. 1 
     1st Quartile 4 
     Mean 6.554 
     3rd Quartile 8 
     Max 17 
Number of 
Institutions 
 
     Min. 1 
     1st Quartile 1 
     Mean 2 
     3rd Quartile 3 
     Max 5 
 
 
 
Notes: *The percentage of first and last authors are not 
the same because 6 first authors and 1 last author were 
omitted from the sample due to missing values. 
All analyses are performed with R and 
the results are reported with their standard 
errors in parentheses and p-values denoted by 
asterisks. 
Table 2 | Probability of being named first or 
last authors by individual covariates 
  First 
Author 
Last  
Author 
Ph.D. 
Year 
 0.09459*** 
(0.02004) 
-0.07134*** 
(0.01518) 
M.D. 
Year 
 0.07659* 
(0.03080)    
-0.07768** 
(0.02786) 
Relative 
Seniority 
 0.05318*** 
(0.01370) 
-0.12200***    
(0.02091)   
Notes: Standard errors are reported beneath the 
coefficients in parentheses. 
* p-value  < 0.05 
** p-value < 0.01 
*** p-value < 0.001 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Results 
 In none of the specifications is gender a significant predictor of the likelihood of an 
author’s being named as an inventor. Being female is not consistently associated with either an 
increase or a decrease of that likelihood, which underscores the insignificance of gender as a 
predictor. On the contrary, collaboration appears to be a significant factor in inventorship 
attribution. In all specifications including only one of the collaboration covariates, an increase in 
the number of authors and institutions is associated with a statistically significant decrease in the 
author’s likelihood of being named an inventor. With greater variation, the number of authors 
often has a larger and more significant effect than the number of institutions. Since the two are 
correlated, when they are both included, only the number of authors is statistically significant, 
masking the effect of the number of institutions in unreported results. 
 Indicator variables concerning advanced degrees are statistically significant. 
Specification 10 shows that not having a Ph.D. is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of 
being named as an inventor by a factor of 0.1684174 (95% Confidence Interval: 0.07931923, 
0.3376534) holding all else constant. Similarly, not having a M.D. is associated with a decrease 
by a factor of 0.4655 (95% CI: 0.23588102, 0.8824146). The effect could be smaller because 
many who do not have an M.D. have a Ph.D., whereas those without a doctorate are less likely to 
have a medical degree. Specification 9 shows that all else equal, having neither degrees is 
associated with a decrease by a factor of 0.1402 (95% CI: 0.03922332, 0.3914629). Authors 
without advanced degrees are extremely unlikely to be named as an inventor when many of their 
coauthors have either or both degrees. These authors, likely technicians and research assistants, 
can be underrepresented in the sample if they are less likely to be named authors as well. 
 Absolute seniority is not a consistently significant predictor. Holding all else constant, 
absolute seniority of Ph.D.’s is somewhat significant in specification 5, which includes an 
interaction term with gender. The interaction allows more flexibility for modeling the effects of 
absolute seniority in the event that they are different between male and female scientists. 
Although the interaction itself is not statistically significant, unreported plots and the improved 
performance of the model overall suggests that gender might have an effect on the relationship 
between absolute seniority of Ph.D.’s and their likelihood of being named as an inventor. On the 
other hand, absolute seniority of M.D.’s is a statistically significant predictor (specification 6). 
Holding all else constant, attaining an M.D. each year later is associated with a decrease in the 
likelihood of being named as an inventor by a factor of 0.9392 (95% CI: 0.0871, 0.9886). In 
unreported results, models including the absolute seniority of Ph.D.’s and M.D.’s, the minimum 
of the two, or both measures, do not yield significant coefficients on those covariates. A possible 
reason is that the model cannot distinguish between which degree and the associated date is 
influential on the inventorship attribution process. Depending on the context of the research 
group i.e. a group of predominantly M.D.’s or Ph.D.’s, those with both degrees might have 
different chances of being named as an inventor. 
 Relative seniority is a consistently significant predictor. Our preferred model is 
specified in the fourth column. It differs from specification 3 in that it does not include the 
indicator for being the last author. Given the strong association between last authorship and 
relative seniority demonstrated earlier, the effect of the relative seniority of authors is dominated 
by that of their being last authors in specification 3. Since first authorship is associated with 
more junior authors, countervailing the effects of relative seniority, the model is more flexible 
than one without first authorship. The choice to use the number of authors rather than that of 
institutions is based on the statistical significance of the predictors as discussed earlier. 
 In our preferred model, the baseline individual, a male non-first author on a paper with 
six (the median) authors who attained an advanced degree the same year as the most senior 
author, has a 63.1815% chance of being named as an inventor. Attaining the first advanced 
degree a year later than the most senior author is associated with a decrease in that likelihood by 
a factor of 0.9575 (95% CI: 0.9317, 0.9828) holding all else constant. Similarly, having one 
more author is associated with a decrease by a factor of 0.9822 (95% CI: 0.7622, 0.9090). On the 
other hand, being the first author is associated with an increase by a factor of 1.7526 (95% CI: 
0.9317, 3.3599) holding all else constant. Being female does not have a significant impact. 
Discussion 
Our regression analysis addresses the impact of gender, collaboration, and seniority on 
inventorship attribution at American research universities. Given the observational nature of our 
data, none of the results imply causality. Nonetheless, the associations provide insight into how 
technology transfer offices at American universities might decrease the number of illegitimate 
discrepancies between authorship and inventorship and the attending vulnerability of those 
patents in their portfolio.  
Our analysis suggests that female scientists are not disadvantaged in inventorship 
attribution at American universities, and their technology transfer offices should instead target 
trends in seniority and collaboration. One limitation is the timeframe of our dataset. As gender 
dynamics have changed in American society in the past decade and a half, they may have also 
changed in laboratories and research universities. If gender equality has increased over this 
period, the insignificance of being female in our results would have been an overestimate and 
further reassures that women today are not systematically disadvantaged in inventorship 
attribution. Another possible scenario involves more uncertainty. Increasing gender equality 
might have increased the number of women in science. The very equality that resulted in their 
being authors would plausibly decrease the effect of gender. However, that equality might also 
change the personality profiles of female scientists at American universities. In order words, In 
other words, the insignificance in our results may have stemmed from other qualities of the 
female researchers that have led them to enter and thrive in science in less equitable times.  The 
persisting gender inequality in inventorship attribution might then become more evident as the 
female faction becomes larger and more diverse. 
Collaboration within and across institutions may be of strong interest to the technology 
transfer offices at American universities. Both the number of authors and that of institutions 
listed on an article were strong predictors for an author being named as an inventor. The negative 
effect of having more authors or institutions implies that the number of authors are increasing 
while the number of inventors remain relatively stable. The strong positive effects of being 
named as a first or last author suggest that those authors are the staple of two to three inventors 
on most patents. This is consistent with Philippe Ducor’s findings in a smaller dataset.49 Given 
the increasing desirability to collaborate, and the rising number of authors and institutions on any 
given research paper, technology transfer officers cannot ignore the trend and continue to name 
or allow the naming of the first and last authors as the sole inventors. 
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With regards to seniority, junior scientists are disadvantaged, particularly if their 
colleagues are much more senior. This is consistent with other studies of the kind.50 It is 
important to note that his association is not causal, and that there are many plausible confounding 
factors that would render senior researchers legitimately more likely to be named as an inventor. 
For example, one might argue that more senior scientists are on average more likely to contribute 
to the conception and design of the experiment than their more junior counterparts on average, as 
they have more resources, experience, and a more directorial role in the laboratory. Although we 
cannot identify the causal effect of seniority, qualitative accounts in the following chapters 
demonstrate that junior scientists have been prejudiced against for their academic rank.  
There are several limitations to our estimates on seniority. If seniority effects have 
weakened since a decade ago, we may have overestimated the impact of seniority on 
inventorship assignment. However, we might have underestimated the impact considering the 
distribution of the authors omitted due to missing values. Only eleven of them were inventors, 
six of them first authors, and only one a last author. Given the strong relationship between 
authorship order and seniority, the omitted authors are likely to be more junior and the omissions 
may have biased the results slightly. A similar analyses on a more recent set of PPPs will reduce 
both problems. Not only will information on current authors be easier to ascertain, but the data 
themselves would reflect a more recent reality. 
Conclusion 
American universities should focus on the impact of seniority and collaboration on 
inventorship attribution. At least in the universities (as opposed to industry), American science 
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does not seem to suffer from strong gender inequality, contrary to the findings in Lissoni et al. 
Our findings with regards to seniority are consistent with those in earlier studies and sociological 
norms in academic science. A less-studied effect is that of collaboration, approximated in terms 
of the number of author and institutions on a publication. These simple measures indicate strong 
and clear effects of collaboration on inventorship attribution. In light of the rising level of 
collaboration among scientists, it might be worthwhile to develop more complete proxies for 
collaboration and conduct the analysis on a more recent dataset to determine longitudinal trends. 
In sum, the results of our study underscore the need to investigate effects of collaboration, and 
develop guidelines to facilitate patent-friendly collaboration in the future. 
Chapter 3: Historical Accounts of Author-Inventor Discrepancies 
Case Study 1: Recombinant DNA 
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) shifted the paradigm of basic and applied research in the 
biomedical sciences. It enabled scientists to combine DNA fragments from different species and 
reproduce the product in large quantities. After collaborators from Stanford University and the 
University of California – San Francisco (UCSF) published their paper51 confirming the faithful 
replication of DNA from Xenopus laevis – a eukaryotic organism in the family of African clawed 
frogs – in the bacterium Escherichia coli, the universities jointly filed a patent application with a 
subset of the authors as inventors.52 Given the demand for rDNA technology, Stanford and 
UCSF arguably could have pursued a more aggressive licensing scheme and generated more 
royalties. Yet due to widespread dissatisfaction among faculty and graduate students at the 
Stanford biochemistry department, who had pioneered rDNA research in the late 1960s,53 and 
discrepancy between authors and inventors, Stanford instead marketed non-exclusive and 
relatively low-price licenses to discourage companies from challenging the patent. The 
discrepancy, in the case of rDNA technology, was not only one about accurately attributing 
credit but also one of significant monetary costs, considering that the patent made around $254 
million for the universities even under the weakened scheme.54 
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Two scientists at the Stanford biochemistry department independently conceived of 
rDNA technology in the late 1960s. In 1965, Paul Berg, who won the 1980 Nobel Prize for his 
contribution to recombinant DNA, attended a seminar by his Stanford colleague Dale Kaiser and 
learned that some mammalian cell viruses such as polyoma and SV40 integrate into the genomes 
of host mammalian cells—just as other viruses that infect bacteria do.55 In a subsequent grant 
application to the American Cancer Society (ACS) in 1970, Berg proposed the construction of 
so-called “trivalent” recombinants containing the entire SV40 genome, the promoter region of 
bacteriophage lambda DV, and the gal operon in E. coli.56 He planned to insert this new 
recombinant into E. coli to produce large quantities of SV40 for cancer research. He also planned 
to insert the recombinant into mammalian cells to see whether they would replicate or express 
the gal operon. The first of its kind, Berg’s pursuit positioned him and his lab at the forefront of 
rDNA technology. 
The other researcher was Peter Lobban, a graduate student in Kaiser’s group. In 1969, he 
also attended a departmental seminar, this time by fellow graduate student Thomas Broker. 
Presenting on an enzyme called terminal transferase, Broker mentioned near the end of his talk 
that it might be able to add nucleotides to the ends of DNA molecules. Upon hearing this, 
Lobban said to himself, “Bingo!”57 On November 6 that year, Lobban proposed a method for 
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joining DNA molecules using terminal transferase and five other enzymes. He wrote, “the 
eventual goal…[is] to produce a collection of transductants synthesizing the products of genes of 
higher organisms.”58 By then, Lobban had started a thesis project to search for what is now 
known as integrase. Yet “so struck by the novelty of his idea,” Berg recalled, Lobban’s thesis 
committee permitted him to switch projects.59 As a second-year graduate student in 1969, 
Lobban foresaw the potential to clone and express eukaryotic genes in prokaryotes. 
Lobban and Berg worked on the technique concurrently, approaching it from different 
angles. Berg needed it to construct the trivalent molecule, which would in turn enable him to 
study cancer viruses and their behavior. Lobban, on the other hand, focused on the method rather 
than its applications. Even though Lobban had discussed insulin and immunoglobulin genes with 
Kaiser, he had joined two bacteriophage P22 molecules instead, despite their comparative lack of 
exciting medical prospects.60 This was a perplexing choice to Berg, but Lobban used P22 
because it was easy to grow and its DNA had blunt ends and so would not automatically re-
anneal. We had “a different mindset,” Lobban explained as the difference between him and Berg; 
“by temperament I'm at least as much an engineer as a scientist. And engineers do model 
systems…then they look for ways to apply it that are more useful. Paul wasn't an engineer at all, 
he's a scientist.”61 In the spring of 1972, both groups were able to create their desired 
recombinant: Lobban synthesized nucleotides at the 5’ ends of bacteriophage P22 monomers to 
construct circular dimers, and David Jackson, a postdoctoral fellow in Berg’s laboratory, 
produced the bacteriophage λdvgal-SV40 trivalent recombinants (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1│Constructing a Recombinant with Terminal Transferase 
 
The mainstream narrative of the origins and conception of rDNA technology, on the other 
hand, has focused mostly on Cohen and Boyer’s meeting at the Japan-United States Joint 
Conference on Bacterial Plasmids in Honolulu in November 1972. Cohen was interested in 
combining his plasmid expertise with Boyer’s in restriction enzyme EcoR1 for cloning. The 
Cohen-Boyer meeting at a local deli afterwards is commonly known as the spawning ground of 
genetic engineering, so much so that the announcement of their Lemelson-MIT award, dubbed 
the “Oscar for Inventors,” opens with the following scene: “Over hot pastrami and corned beef 
sandwiches, Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen opened the door to genetic engineering and laid 
the foundations for gene therapy and the biotechnology industry.”62 Another celebrated 
microbiologist Stanley Falkow was present at the meal, and titled his recollection “I’ll have the 
chopped liver please, or how I learned to love the clone.”63 
Following the Conference in Honolulu, Cohen and Boyer collaborated on the first 
demonstration of recombinant DNA cloning in 1973.64 Cohen and his technician, Annie Chang, 
proceeded to clone DNA from Staphylococcus aureus, the same time John Morrow, a graduate 
student in Berg’s group, was covertly collaborating with them to clone Xenopus DNA.65  The 
Staph. paper became the basis for the ‘224 patent, but the Xenopus experiment made it “clear that 
you could put any DNA into E. coli. And, that’s when the whole thing exploded.”66 In a New 
York Times article covering the Chang experiment, Cohen said, “the same ability to create what 
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amounts to new species of bacteria could lead to colonies of E. coli, equipped with the gene-
carrying plasmids, growing large supplies of insulin for diabetics, who now depend on supplies 
obtained from beef and pork pancreases.”67 Indeed, he social consequences of rDNA technology 
proved to be enormous, but not all were happy about the focus on this trio of Cohen-Boyer 
papers. 
Aside from Berg and Lobban, another critical scientist not on the Xenopus or 
Staphylococcus paper was Janet Mertz, who joined Berg’s group in December 1970 to study 
mammalian virus SV40. In the spring of 1972, Mertz discovered that EcoR1 created cohesive 
ends at its cleavage sites. She was charged with identifying potentially useful variants of the 
SV40 virus, and more specifically with determining whether linear SV40 DNA was infectious. 
After repeatedly observing infectious activity in cut SV40 molecules, Mertz hypothesized that 
EcoR1-cleaved sites had cohesive ends and could thus be joined to create circular infectious 
DNA. 68 Over the night of April 22, 1972, Mertz determined with electron microscopy that the 
SV40 linear molecules had indeed circularized. She then worked with Ronald Davis, an assistant 
professor in the department, in May and early June to construct SV40-λdvgal 120 recombinants 
using her method.69 The discovery was critical to the advent of rDNA, as Cohen and Boyer used 
it to recombine plasmid DNA, and subsequently clone them for the first time.70 
In retrospect, Mertz wishes that her mentors and department had filed a patent application 
in 1972, when she had made the EcoR1 discovery, because “then the Stanford bio-chemistry 
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department was responsible for the development of all of the ideas, all of the methods because 
we did all of them before Cohen even had his first idea about making a recombinant DNA 
clone.”71 Berg and Lobban had conceived of the technology in the late 1960s; Lobban and 
Jackson had developed the terminal transferase method in early 1972, after which Mertz made 
her EcoR1 discovery; and others in the Kaiser lab had developed the calcium chloride 
precipitation method for inserting DNA molecules into E. coli long before. Moreover, Lobban 
had adapted the method for phage and Mertz for viral and plasmid DNA which they shared with 
Cohen.72 Morrow felt that “every one of the claims of the patent had been demonstrated by 
Mertz and Davis except…claim number 12 because they did not clone,”73 and could not clone 
due to the self-imposed rDNA moratorium on oncogenic viruses they were working with at the 
time. So essential to the advent of rDNA technology, communalism and collaboration in 
Stanford’s biochemistry department were ironically a source of contention in attributing 
inventorship. 
As case law and the official interpretation of USPTO dictate that inventors “must 
contribute to conception” and that “reduction to practice, per se, is irrelevant…insofar as 
defining an inventor is concerned,” Lobban and Berg had strong claims to inventorship.74 For 
instance, Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., defines conception as “the formation in 
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the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative 
invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.”75 Through his research proposal in 1969, 
Lobban had demonstrated a definite and permanent idea of rDNA technology. Berg’s ACS grant 
proposal was an early documentation of his independent conception. Even Falkow, an 
eyewitness of the Honolulu meeting, emphasized the important but practical contribution Cohen 
and Boyer made to rDNA technology: 
The idea of joining distinct DNA species had been at the cutting edge of molecular biology and was, in 
fact, the focus of Berg’s group, as well as those of Kaiser and Lobban, but [the meeting produced] a direct 
way to do the experiment…Cohen and Boyer did not receive the Nobel Prize for their 
contribution…However, in my view, [they] performed the most clear-cut gene splicing experiments and the 
most convincing. They reduced it to practice.76 
In a recent interview, Lobban revealed, “if I'd known then what I know now I certainly would 
have had no trouble in joining an effort to try to show that the patent was invalid… simply 
because the claims have to do with the things that [biochemistry people] conceptualized. And we 
conceptualized them before Stan Cohen did.” After Mertz’s “sticky-end” discovery, in particular, 
one could argue that genetic engineering and cloning involved less conception than reduction to 
practice.  
Neither were the authors of the trio of papers all satisfied with the attribution of credit 
over rDNA technology. Morrow, a graduate student in Berg’s group, proposed the experiment on 
eukaryotic DNA, contributed the most figures, and subsequently was first author on the resulting 
paper. When he learned of what became the Cohen-Boyer patent application, he felt excluded 
from his rightful inventorship. Even though he did not think that he had a role equal to Cohen 
and Boyer, he felt that he “played an original role in proposing the project and going through 
what was needed to demonstrate that we had steadily and faithfully replicated these Xenopus 
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DNA sequences in E. coli.”77 Robert Helling, a visiting researcher at Boyer’s laboratory, refused 
to waive his inventorship. He “felt that [he] was part and parcel of the whole thing, and [did] not 
want to sign a letter saying that [he] was just another laboratory worker.”78 Annie Chang, 
Cohen’s technician, was the only one who signed the waiver. 
Although to no avail, Helling and his home institution, the University of Michigan, 
pushed for his inventorship claim, partially because there was a financial gain at stake. On the 
other hand, Morrow had become an assistant professor at Johns Hopkins by the time he learned 
about the patent application in 1978. Despite his conviction that he contributed significantly to 
claim 11 on the patent (see Appendix I), which if true would qualify him for co-inventorship 
under American patent law (which does not require co-inventors to contribute the same amount 
or to the entire invention but only to at least one claim),79 Johns Hopkins would not legally 
represent him in defense of his claim, since he had not completed the relevant work at Johns 
Hopkins and the University did not stand to gain monetarily. “I had nearly no money,” Morrow 
added, “so it would’ve been quite a challenge for me, practically speaking, to have established 
my rights, even if I had excellent claims.”80  
The discrepancy led to many monetary costs for Stanford in way of a prolonged legal 
battle with patent examiner Alvin Tanenholtz to approve the claims. It took six years before the 
examiner accepted that Cohen and Boyer provided the “major inspiration and direction” for the 
experiments described in the Staph. and Xenopus papers.81 Tanenholtz initially rejected all 
claims in the ‘224 patent on the grounds of missing inventors because “the inventive entity of the 
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instant application is different from the authors of the references, Cohen et al (1973), Chang et al 
(1974), and Morrow et al (1974).”82 In response, Rowland distinguished between co-authors and 
co-inventors, arguing that Cohen and Boyer directed the rest of the co-authors on the referenced 
articles. He also alluded to scientific norms, arguing that, “senior authors normally publish 
contemporaneously with co-workers and graduate students,” and denied “any basis for 
suggesting that Annie Chang, Professor Cohen’s student, is in fact a co-inventor, rather than a 
co-author.” 83 In a communal environment, where junior researchers collaborated with 
established professors and received first authorship on different occasions, as was in the case 
here, the distinction between co-authorship and co-inventorship was difficult to define and 
defend. 
On October 4, 1979, Tanenholtz issued a final rejection of all claims over “the inventive 
entity,” rejecting all of Rowland’s justifications for listing Cohen and Boyer as sole inventors.  
He further insisted that the references could only be removed through “a disclaiming affidavit or 
declaration by the other authors.” Rowland recalled,  
…when the case was originally filed, under the rule of In re Katz I believe, I sent letters to all of the other 
authors of the three articles asking them to waive any inventorship interest. Of the nine inquiries, one 
agreed and the others either did not respond or sent unkind letters about the inventors and Stanford’s filing 
of the application. One professor claimed joint inventorship. I did not pursue this avenue any further, but 
chose to swear back of the references.84   
Without disclaimers, Rowland filed a Declaration by Cohen and Boyer “that work was done by 
them or under their supervision antedating all the articles of which they are co-authors and 
demonstrating a reduction to practice of the subject invention.” The Declaration focused 
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primarily on Cohen, et al. (1973). Tanenholtz finally conceded in a telephone interview with 
Rowland on March 14, 1980, and approved claims 1 to 13 and 16.85  
The discrepancy between authors and inventors rendered the patent vulnerable to 
challenges and invalidation under U.S. law.86 This vulnerability in turn constrained Stanford’s 
licensing programs. Stanford licensed rDNA technology broadly and at low cost not solely to 
widely distribute the technology and contribute to the subsequent development of commercial 
biotechnology, but also to keep costs low and licensing terms reasonable to reduce the incentive 
to challenge to the patent.87  Reimers recalled, “I got one letter from an alumnus: ‘…Why are 
you charging such a low royalty?’…Well, [the patent] was a bit flaky…whether we could get the 
broad claims.”88 Helling pointed out Stanford’s practical reasoning in a letter to Nature in 1997: 
[The Stanford licensing] policy was set carefully so as to generate the largest possible return without causing 
the patent to be contested. Companies wishing to use the technology weighed the cost of royalties against the 
cost of a suit and eventually all decided it was cheaper to pay royalties….  If the patent had been contested, 
there is a significant probability that it would have been ruled invalid.89  
Had the patent been invalidated on inventorship grounds, Stanford would have sustained 
considerable legal costs (UCSF did not share these costs) and attained no royalties. Reimers 
therefore made a conscious decision to charge little for a technology that arguably had a 
relatively inelastic demand in the biomedical establishment. 90 
Beyond the justice in correctly assigning credit and the monetary costs associated, the 
discrepancy could also have had a macroeconomic cost to the research establishment. Then and 
now, Berg and many others felt that credit was not appropriately attributed. Reimers remembered 
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that “Paul Berg wanted to meet with me, and he was quite upset that I had filed on this case, very 
upset. Then he noted the work that he and his student—Janet Mertz—had done earlier.”91 In 
2010, Berg and Mertz characterized “[Cohen and Boyer’s] claims to commercial ownership of 
the techniques for cloning all possible DNAs, in all possible vectors, joined in all possible ways, 
in all possible organisms [as] dubious, presumptuous, and hubristic.”92 They are currently 
drafting a response to Cohen’s recent recollection, in which they felt the author deliberately 
excluded their contributions and those of others in the biochemistry department.93 Given the 
communal spirit of the department, which welcomed Cohen despite his official appointment 
being in the Department of Medicine in the early 1970s, the discrepancy and subsequent disputes 
have also incurred a cost in collaborative potential. 
Case Study 2: Streptomycin 
The streptomycin case differs from the recombinant DNA case in that the junior scientist, 
a postdoctoral researcher Albert Schatz, was named as a coinventor on the Streptomycin patent 
with his doctoral adviser, postdoctoral mentor, and Nobel Laureate Selman Waksman.94 The 
discrepancy no longer lied in inventorship assignment but in their differential treatment as 
coinventors. Yet this case also underscores the importance of accurate assignment because 
treating Schatz more as a coauthor and Waksman as both that and an inventor cost Rutgers 
University greatly in monetary and reputational terms. Denied royalties and kept in secrecy 
regarding the patent for many years, Schatz sued Waksman in 1949 and achieved a private 
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settlement in December 1950, receiving a lump sum of $125,000 and 3% of the royalties in the 
remaining years of the patent.95 With newspaper articles in from the New York Times and The 
Guardian to scholarly ones in Nature highlighting the contributions of Schatz96, as well as books 
written in favor of the junior scientist,97 the streptomycin controversy has imposed great 
reputational costs on Waksman and Rutgers University as well. This cost is augmented because 
the deception and scandal surrounding the University and Waksman’s conduct created more of a 
“hate campaign” easily relatable to the masses than a more technical debate on scientific priority, 
which some argue tips in Waksman’s favor.98 The discrepancy in the treatment of coinventors 
can be costly to research universities. 
On August 23, 1943, Schatz isolated two trains of a gray-green actionmycete named 
Streptomyces griseus. After experiments arranged by Waksman at Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, 
one of the strains became known as streptomycin, the wonder drug that cured tuberculosis. In 
1944, Schatz, Waksman, and another graduate student Elizabeth Bugie jointly published the 
discovery of streptomycin, with Schatz as the first author.99 The next year, Schatz and Waksman 
were made co-inventors for the antibiotic, while Bugie was excluded for no known reasons.100 
After the USPTO granted the patent, Rutgers set up a new trust, the Rutgers Research and 
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Endowment Foundation (RREF), and offered Waksman a percentage of the royalties in exchange 
for rights to “all improvements and future inventions.”101 In the end, Waksman emerged not only 
as the beneficiary for 20% of the royalties but also as the manager of the patents. Without 
disclosing these ties to the Foundation, Waksman persuaded Schatz to assign his rights to the 
‘866 patent to the Foundation, and would continue to do so for foreign patents on the drug for 
several years.102 In the period leading up to May 1946, when Schatz left Rutgers for a position at 
the New York Department of Health, Waksman had ceased describing Schatz as the discoverer 
or even the co-discoverer of streptomycin, but merely as his assistant.103 In addition, Waksman 
had Schatz sign a letter typed by his secretary, advised by Russell Watson, the Foundation 
lawyer in anticipation of the “Schatz claim” on streptomycin, including a passage clearly 
relegating Schatz to the rank of an assistant.104 
In 1949, Schatz sued his former professor and the university, when he found out that he 
was a co-inventor only in name and that Waksman had been receiving payments covertly from 
the Rutgers Foundation. Like Morrow, he had a tight budget, but unlike Morrow, Schatz had the 
fortune of a wily uncle who found him a lawyer willing to take the case on a contingency fee 
basis, so that he did not have to pay unless he won. Schatz claimed that he was “under pressure 
amounting to blackmail” to assign his patent rights to the Foundation;105 he recalled hesitating to 
sign on May 3, 1946, and that Waksman threatened to take his name off the patent application 
and “kill job chances” with his influence.106 If these claims were true, they show the uneven 
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power balance between professors and their students. This dynamic according to Schatz, was 
also the reason he signed the letter before he left: “I signed because I needed letters of 
recommendation from him when I applied for jobs.”107 To avoid negative publicity, Rutgers 
reached a generous settlement with Schatz, and Waksman sent $500 dollar checks to all of his 
twenty-four former assistants “to present a more generous picture and protect Waksman from 
further litigation.”108 
Despite the monetary efforts on the part of the university and Waksman, the negative 
publicity nonetheless followed. Newspapers took Schatz’s sides, with headlines such as “He 
Finally Gets Credit” and “Dr. Schatz is modest in victory.”109 A former assistant found the 
general consensus on Waksman was that he “was a shrewd codger and you cleared away some of 
his manure pile to expose the true contents of the man.”110 Even Russell Watson, the Foundation 
lawyer who believed it would have won in court but succumbed to the Trustees’ fear of 
unfavorable publicity,111 was pessimistic: he wrote personally to Waksman that the newspaper 
accounts “were grievously injurious to the University and to you, in less degree to the University 
than to you. How long this public impression will persist is uncertain.”112 The impression 
persisted and in many ways has been renewed in recent years. Milton Wainwright “attempted to 
redress an historical imbalance in favour of Albert Schatz” in his book Miracle Cure in 2001.113 
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The next year, Nature published an article that used the streptomycin case to support its claim 
that “the misallocation of credit is endemic in science” and concluding that “Waksman created 
the myth that he alone deserved the credit.”114 The publication of Experiment Eleven in 2012 
further shows ongoing interest in the debate. Furthermore, many popular science channels, 
including Scientific American, has framed Schatz as one of the most notable omissions from the 
Nobel Prize.115 
The lack of standardized protocol with regards to the relationship between inventors and 
the university contributed to the monetary and reputational costs sustained by Rutgers through 
Schatz’s litigation and the controversy that followed. The Foundation operated in a nearly ad hoc 
fashion, not only prejudicing against junior inventors but also allowing Waksman to wield his 
influence and seniority in legal and PR affairs. In particular, Waksman attempted to circumvent 
Schatz’s rights as an inventor with tactics that reflected badly upon his character as well as his 
institution. Had Schatz been excluded from inventorship, as fellow graduate student Bugie was, 
the streptomycin case would not be much different than that of rDNA, and Rutgers could have 
maintained that Schatz was merely a “pair of hands.” Instead, they faced a hard place between 
two rocks: removing his inventorship or compensating him both implied past remises. 
Regardless of whether Schatz’s inventorship was correctly awarded, Waksman had abused his 
power and employed strategies that would be difficult to explain away if they surfaced. 
                                                          
114 Lawrence. "Rank injustice." (2002). 
115 “No Nobel For You: Top 10 Nobel Snubs.” Scientific American. 2008. Accessed February 9, 2014. 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/slideshow/10-nobel-snubs. For the websites that list Schatz as a winner, see 
www.garynull.com/Issues/Fluoride/FluorideVoices.htm, www.shirleys-wellness-cafe.com/fluoride.htm, and 
www.apfn.org./apfn/poison.htm. All accessed 27 January 2004, in Kingston, ““Streptomycin, Schatz v. Waksman.” 
(2004). 
One such strategy was the claim of missing notebooks. In May 1946, Waksman claimed 
that a member of Schatz’s family broke into the laboratory and carried off Schatz’s notebooks 
that contained the critical streptomycin experiments. He went as far as to install locks on the 
laboratories, even though he knew that the notebooks, Schatz’s and his own, were with the 
technology transfer officers at the University and Merck. As part of the lawsuit, he further 
suggested that Schatz had removed crucial pages in the notebook as an attempt to damage his 
credibility in court. In 2010, a librarian at Rutgers found the notebook in Waksman’s papers. A 
page was indeed cut out, but it was toward the end of the streptomycin experiment, and the 
previous pages had demonstrated Schatz’s discovery decidedly. Furthermore, Waksman’s 
correspondence with his lawyers show that they knew the page was “insignificant” but 
deliberately leveraged the claim to instill doubt anyway.116  
The moral pitfalls of Waksman by no means imply that Schatz was owed scientific credit, 
as many have been eager to suggest, especially about the Nobel Prize. Rather, they are calls for 
standardized protocols for translating authorship to inventorship, so as not to give unqualified 
graduate students incentives and standing to litigate. The freedom with which Waksman acted 
reminds research universities to adhere to their assignment decisions irrespective of traditional 
professor-student dynamics in academia. The discrepancy between authorship and inventorship 
was nominal in the rDNA case, whereas it lies in the practical treatment of the named inventors 
here. The histories show that either type of discrepancy can incur high monetary and reputational 
costs for research universities. 
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Even the judging proceedings behind the 1952 Nobel Prize of Medicine represent a 
strong case for improving authorship documentation in academia, not only in light of new forms 
of credit such as inventorship but also with regards to the oldest and most prestigious in the 
institution of science. In 1952, the only year Schatz was nominated, by a Yugoslav professor of 
medicine, Einar Hammerson, a professor of chemistry at the Karolinska Institutet was charged 
with recommending the final recipients for Nobel to be awarded for streptomycin. By one of 
many idiosyncratic rules of the Prize, Hammerson could not read materials aside from scholarly 
articles. He did not read the patent applications, lab notebooks, or Schatz’s thesis to conclude 
that he was only an assistant of inferior rank – “medarbetare” in Swedish – in the discovery of 
streptomycin. Some argue that the result was just because Schatz’s discovery did not require new 
insights but repetitive testing with known techniques.117 What undermines the credibility of this 
system is not the validity of the final decision but that Hammerson made factual mistakes in his 
deductive endeavor.118 Without descriptions of the actual contributions of each author, one can 
imagine how difficult it would be to choose one, two, or three of them for the coveted prize. 
Those – including prestigious research universities - irate at so-called Nobel snubs - especially of 
their faculty - can reduce future frustration by advocating for more detailed and accurate 
authorship documentation in scholarly journals.  
Case Study 3: Herpes Vaccine 
 Neither the rDNA nor the streptomycin course was decided in court. A more recent 
dispute between a postdoctoral student at the University of Chicago, Joany Chou, and her 
supervisor Bernard Roizman was decided in favour of the junior research in 2001. Chou co-
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discovered a vaccine for the herpes virus and co-authored a paper with Roizman on the topic. 
Excluded from inventorship, she sued for correction. Furthermore, she sued successfully for 
fraudulent concealment on the part of her professor. The ruling is relevant to research 
universities and their technology transfer offices because the court established a legal precedent 
that such institutions were liable for the actions of their faculty, who in turn had a fiduciary duty 
to their students. In light of the ruling, to minimize legal costs and reputational backlash, 
universities have incentives to better police illegitimate discrepancies between authorship and 
inventorship assignments, and to ensure that tenured faculty do not abuse their seniority and 
influence in the translation from paper to patent. 
 In February 1991, Chou approached Roizman about patenting her discoveries relating to 
the herpes simplex virus and its use in an avirulent vaccine. Although Roizman advised her 
against it, he filed a patent as the sole inventor of the work around the same time. In 1996, Chou 
became suspicious when Roizman requested that she resign. She soon discovered that the patent 
he had filed had been granted, and that he was receiving substantial royalty payments from the 
University of Chicago, to which the patent was assigned. As a result, she sued Roizman, the 
University of Chicago, and the company that had licensed the technology, Aviron. The District 
Court in Illinois concluded that Chou did not have standing to challenge the inventorship, 
because her inventorship rights, even if she had them, would have been assigned to the 
University of Chicago by her employment contract.119 On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that “an expectation of ownership of a patent is not a prerequisite for a putative inventor to 
possess standing to sue to correct inventorship under Section 256.”120  
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Several rulings are relevant to research universities and their technology transfer offices. 
The Federal Circuit found Roizman guilty of fraudulent concealment and breach of fiduciary 
duty “given the disparity of their experience and roles, and Roizman’s responsibility to make 
patenting decisions regarding Chou’s inventions.”121 The University of Chicago was held liable 
for both actions “under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”122 Research universities therefore 
have a legal stake in ensuring accurate credit attribution, not only on patents but also on 
scholarly articles. After the court defined the legal relationship between professors and students, 
and the relationship between universities and their employees, research universities have the 
responsibility to interfere when faculty abuse traditional hierarchy to enlarge their credit. The 
court also discouraged universities from abusing that hierarchy, as it found the University guilty 
of breaching its express contract to Chou because “counsel for the University and Roizman 
reviewed her laboratory notebooks on April 20, 1999…decided that [she] was an inventor…[but 
never sent] the paperwork to correct inventorship.”123 
The Federal Circuit decision was both “a major victory for student researchers”124 and a 
wakeup call to research universities. Having long left credit attribution to professors, respecting 
the unique norms governing basic science, the universities are now legally liable for illegitimate 
discrepancies between authorship and inventorship. Although the share of royalties to which 
Chou became entitled did not diminish the University’s revenues but Roizman’s, the University 
sustained monetary costs for the litigation process. Other tangible costs include potential 
damages the courts may grant to student researchers, who may be more inclined to voice their 
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grievances now that Chou’s case had set a favorable precedent. Beyond legal and associated 
monetary costs, discrepancies between authorship and inventorship, especially in the context of 
professors and students, whose helpless situation is so embraced by the popular press, can 
impose significant reputational costs to research universities and their faculty. If not for the 
inherent justice in accurate credit attribution, research universities have been given many other 
incentives to better police authorship and inventorship practice in light of University of Chicago 
vs. Chou. 
  
Conclusion 
Discrepancies between inventors on patents and authors on their corresponding papers 
can impose significant monetary and reputational costs on research universities. The case studies 
provide qualitative evidence for such costs. The regression analysis corroborates some of the 
findings from the case studies. My analysis points toward a way forward for American 
universities to reduce conflict, reward authorship and inventorship, and better manage faculty 
and student contributions in the commercialization of their work. Universities can protect 
themselves by being aware of and acting on the differences and similarities between authorship 
and inventorship. 
Both the case studies and the regression analysis suggest that junior researchers are 
disadvantaged in the technology transfer process from papers to patents. Results from the 
regression corroborate the conclusion that being female does not significantly affect an author’s 
likelihood of being named as an inventor. The most concerning trend is increasing scientific 
collaboration. Given a growing number of authors on each paper and the prevalence of 
collaboration among scientists, technology transfer offices might consider implementing 
electronic laboratory notebooks among other measures to improve accountability in the 
publishing and patenting processes both at their universities and beyond. A more complex 
knowledge production process involving more players plausibly requires a more systematic 
monitoring process. 
The three case studies present examples of costs that the discrepancies can impose on 
universities. Even though the vulnerabilities of Stanford’s rDNA patents were never brought to 
court, the prolonged legal battle with examiner Tanenholtz and the weakened licensing scheme 
imposed significant monetary costs on Stanford University. In the streptomycin case, the senior 
scientist, Selman Waksman, was heavily involved in the patenting process, occasionally in ways 
that would reflect badly upon him. When the junior scientist, Albert Schatz—perhaps bolder and 
luckier than his counterparts Robert Helling and John Morrow at Stanford—brought his 
accusations to court, they posed a large public relations problem for the relatively smaller, much 
less prestigious Rutgers University. In the end, the solution involved significant monetary 
compensation from the university to the student. The only case to have been decided in court, 
University of Chicago vs. Chou not only imposed reputation and monetary cost on the University 
but also showed that research universities have a legal responsibility to ensure their faculty 
employees carry out their fiduciary duty to their students. 
The case studies also suggest that junior scientists are more frequently lost in the 
translation from paper to patent (that is, were listed as authors but not as inventors). This is 
corroborated and further generalized by my regression analysis. Receiving an advanced degree 
each year later than the most senior author is associated with a decrease in the author’s likelihood 
of being named an inventor by a factor of 0.9575. Neither the regression coefficients nor the case 
studies alone provides convincing evidence that the lack of relative seniority causes the junior 
scientists to be excluded. It seems plausible, however, that given the case study on streptomycin, 
some junior scientists have been excluded precisely because they are junior. Since it would be 
impractical to track every interaction of every scientist, there is no simple method for 
distinguishing legitimate exclusion from illegitimate exploitation. American universities might 
better prevent the illegitimate cases and associated costs by educating students and their mentors 
about their duties to each other and the criteria for appropriately attributing authorship and 
inventorship in their publishing and patenting endeavors.  
Unlike seniority, gender is not a significant predictor of discrepancies between authors 
and inventors. Mertz emphatically dismissed the possibility that she was disadvantaged by her 
gender.125 More recently, Chou did not seem inhibited by her gender when she won her case 
against her mentor Roizman and the University of Chicago. Both episodes and the PPP data 
suggest that women were not discriminated against on the basis of gender. This conclusion 
applies to women who have published in academic science, for they may be plausibly different in 
relevant ways than those who have not pursued science or succeeded, particularly in the time 
frames of our case studies and data. Assuming that the profile of women in science does not 
change, the current emphasis on gender equality bodes well for gender to become an even less 
significant factor determining authorship and inventorship.  
The PPP analysis alerts us to discrepancies and associated costs that growing 
collaboration might pose for the technology transfer offices at research universities. While the 
number of authors skyrockets in science, the number of coinventors remains relatively stable. 
Whether increasing levels of collaboration arise from the burden of knowledge, demands of 
technology, or other causes, the phenomenon needs to be addressed at research institutions so as 
to avoid prolonging patent examinations and weakening patent portfolios as well as to lower the 
chances of incurring the reputational and monetary costs of resolving conflicts in court. First, 
universities need to better understand the landscape of academic collaboration. This may entail 
developing more accurate measures of collaboration for more recent PPP datasets to confirm the 
relationships inferred from crude proxies such as the number of institutions and authors. Then, 
universities can better assess how they can best adapt their programs to minimize discrepancies, 
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perhaps by naming more inventors, working with journals and scientists to mitigate unnecessary 
growth in the number of coauthors, or both.  
In practice, universities might best protect themselves by increasing transparency and 
accountability in managing authorship and inventorship.  Technology transfer offices in 
universities can encourage the use of electronic lab notebooks and keeping detailed records. Had 
Schatz’s notebooks been archived by Rutgers’ licensing office, the scandal surrounding the 
“eleventh experiment” may not have occurred. The U Chicago vs. Chou verdict further 
demonstrated the importance of using the information in lab notebooks, as the University was 
guilty of breach of duty for never mailing Chou the paperwork to correct inventorship after 
determining that she was indeed an inventor, according to her lab notebooks. To facilitate greater 
transparency and accountability across institutions, universities might consider forming networks 
with other academic institutions to securely share information such as that in electronic 
notebooks. Journals can help reduce discrepancies between the authors and inventors. By 
requiring authors to specify their individual contributions, journals can not only ensure 
adherence to authorship guidelines but also provide useful information to technology transfer 
officers, particularly when authors collaborate across institutions. Technology transfer offices 
can also deal with inventorship with particular attention to the rights and interests of junior 
faculty and staff who contribute to inventions, by asking for explicit reasons that authors on 
papers are not included as inventors on patents.  In sum, American universities should educate 
faculty and students on appropriate conduct in publishing and patenting, adapt existing practices 
at the technology transfer office to growing collaboration and growth of research teams, and 
foster an environment of accountability and transparency to reduce the monetary costs and 
reputational harms associated with failing to properly include inventors on patents. 
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Claims: 
1. A method for replicating a biologically functional DNA, which comprises: 
transforming under transforming conditions compatible unicellular organisms with 
biologically functional DNA to form transformants; said biologically functional DNA 
prepared in vitro by the method of: 
(a) cleaving a viral or circular plasmid DNA compatible with said unicellular organism to 
provide a first linear segment having an intact replicon and termini of a predetermined 
character; 
(b) combining said first linear segment with a second linear DNA segment, having at 
least one intact gene and foreign to said unicellular organism and having termini ligatable 
to said termini of said first linear segment, wherein at least one of said first and second 
linear DNA segments has a gene for a phenotypical trait, under joining conditions where 
the termini of said first and second segments join to provide a functional DNA capable of 
replication and transcription in said unicellular organism; 
growing said unicellular organisms under appropriate nutrient conditions; and 
isolating said transformants from parent unicellular organisms by means of said 
phenotypical trait imparted by said biologically functional DNA. 
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein said unicellular organisms are bacteria. 
3. A method according to claim 2, wherein said transformation is carried out in the presence of 
calcium chloride. 
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein said phenotypical trait is resistance to growth 
inhibiting substance, and said growth is carried out in the presence of a sufficient amount of said 
growth inhibiting substance to inhibit the growth of parent unicellular organisms, but insufficient 
to inhibit the growth of transformants. 
5. A method according to claim 1, wherein said unicellular organism is E. coli. 
6. A method according to claim 1, wherein said predetermined termini are staggered and 
cohesive. 
7. A method according to claim 6, wherein said joining conditions includes enzymatic ligation. 
8. A method according to claim 6, wherein said cohesive ends are formed by staggered cleavage 
of said viral or circular plasmid DNA and a source of said second segment with a restriction 
enzyme. 
9. A method acording to claim 6 wherein said cohesive termini are formed by addition of 
nucleotides. 
10. A method according to claim 1, wherein said predetermined termini are blunt end and said 
joining conditions include enzymatic ligation. 
11. A method for replicating a biologically functional DNA comprising a replicon compatible 
with a host unicellular organism joined to a gene derived from a source which does not exchange 
genetic information with said host organism, said method comprising: 
isolating said biologically functional DNA from transformants prepared in accordance 
with claim 1; 
transforming unicellular microorganisms with which said replicon is compatible with said 
isolated DNA to provide second transformants; and 
growing said second transformants under appropriate nutrient conditions to replicate said 
biologically functional DNA. 
12. A method for producing a protein foreign to a unicellular organism by means of expression 
of a gene by said unicellular organism, wherein said gene is derived from a source which does 
not exchange genetic information with said organism, said method comprising: 
growing transformants prepared in accordance with any of claims 1 and 11 under 
appropriate nutrient conditions, whereby said organism expresses said foreign gene and 
produces said protein. 
13. A method according to claim 12, wherein said protein is an enzyme. 
14. A method according to claim 11, wherein said method is repeated substituting said 
biologically functional DNA from transformants prepared in accordance with claim 1 with 
second or subsequent transformants to produce additional transformants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
